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COMPOUNDS.
A MODEL FOR SOUTHERN AFRICAN
Rob Turrell
While it is by now conventional wisdom that the compound
'provided the framework for the total exploitation of ...
black workers',1 it has often been assumed by historians
that the late nineteenth century closed compounds at
Kimberley provided a superior material and social
environment to their imitators on the Rand and in Southern
Rhodesia.2 This assumption has been based on- diamond mine
owners' claims to have created an attractive social
microcosm in their compounds, in which African workers were
forced to spend their non-working lives for the duration of
a contract. Moreover, the mine owners argued that it was
these model social welfare compounds that compensated for a
worker's loss of freedom. And it was a measure of the
validity of their claim, they continued, that the mines never
went short of labour and thus did not need to resort to
labour recruitment.3
This view of model diamond compounds in the 1880s and
1890s is a mine owner's myth. In the areas of accommodation,
diet and health care, early Kimberley compounds were not
markedly superior to the standards found in early Rand and
Southern Rhodesian compounds. Van Onselen has compared
conditions in these latter two mining regions and shown
that, e-f the two, Rhodesian compounds were worse. The
effect's of inadequate compounds can most clearly be seen
in the high death rate on Rhodesian mines:
... if the death rate due to syphilis, phthisis
and underground accidents was alarming, the three
causes together accounted for deaths in hundreds;
but the industry's parsimony over food and
accommodation produced deaths numbered in thousands.
The greatest killers of all on Rhodesian mines were
diseases which could be directly attributed to the
inadequate diet and poor standards of accommodation
for workers.''
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The death rate on Rhodesian mines was at its worst in the
early twentieth century. Between 1906 and 1915 the mines
employed an average of 28,000 African workers and over this
period the death rate averaged 43.40 per thousand.5 It is
ag'ainst this record that this essay seeks to measure the
model compounds of Kimberley.
In the 1870s African mine labourers in Kimberley either
lived on their employers' compounds, which were a combina-
tion of residence and work-place, or they fended for them-
selves in the numerous camps or locations. In the late
1870s the mine owners attempted to subject migrant African
labourers to a more systematic industrial discipline. Part
of this process was to separate mine labourers from the
townships of Kimberley and to force them to live on their
employers' compounds. In 1879 the state endorsed the
compulsory board and lodging of servants on employers'
compounds. These were open in the sense that Africans were
free to go on the town. But at this time the mine owners
failed to find the class unity to enforce this measure in
the face of African resistance.
In 1882, after the transformation of the mines from
individual into joint-stock company ownership, a more
detailed compound structure was developed 'It shall be the
duty of each employer to house his Native servants1,
reported a Joint Committee representing the four mines,
to supply them with food and drink; to surround each
compound with a corrugated iron fence; to erect a
gate or gates, and to employ a gate-keeper or
keepers, whose duty it shall be to prevent any other
than the servants of such employer entering such '.
compound ...
Here compounds were simply barracks to accommodate the
20,000 strong African work force. In the early 1880s these
remained open institutions and housed the majority of
African mine labourers.
At the turn of the decade the mine owners began to talk
of transforming open into closed compounds. The original
discussion was informed by a description of slave labour
control on the Brazilian diamond fields.7 In Kimberley,
closed compounds were to be the means of maintaining tight
control over African migrant workers, who would be confined
for the duration of a contract.
In April 1885 the first compound was closed by the
Kimberley Central Diamond Mining Company (DMC), the richest
company in Kimberley mine. In late 1885 the De Beers DMC,
the premier company in Do Beers mine, began to build a
compound for its free workers and closed it in June 1886.
In the poorer mines of Bultfontein and DuToitspan the
pioneer in this field was the Bultfontein Minin9 Company.
By March 1889, when the controlling interest in all four
mines had been acquired by De Beers Consolidated Mines
Limited, the mine work force of 10,000 Africans was
(•'
Kimbarlcy'n Clou ad Compounds
confined in seventeen closed compounds: three for
Kimberley mine, two for De Beers mine, seven for Dutoitspan
mine and five for Dultfontein mine.9
The prevention of diamond theft and the elimination of
illicit diamond buying (IDB) have been the most common
explanations among historians for the development of closed
compounds at the Kimberley mines.9 As has been argued
elsewhere,18 this view is too simple, abstracting one
factor from a complex process of capital accumulation and
class struggle. Rather, the construction of closed
compounds in the 1880s was integrally related to the
development of industrial capitalism in the diamond mines
and was one of the ways in which the mine owners restored
profitability in the crisis of 1882-1885. Closed compounds
were critically linked to the development of underground
mining, which required the investment of large amounts of
capital. The rapid concentration and centralization of
capital that underground mining required also dictated a
more rigorous control of migrant labour, the unregulated
scarcity and abundance of which had persistently hindered
the process of accumulation. In fact, the closed compound
system was the effective form in which the diamond mine
owners came to terms with migrant labour.
Crucially, the development of the productive forces
through underground mining entailed a fundamental change
in the social organisation 6f production and in particular
in the exercise of authority and supervision in the work-
place. It is not, however, the purpose of this essay to
describe this re-organisation of production. Nonetheless,
it is, perhaps, worthwhile to summarise the major features
of those changes that were affected by the introduction
of closed compounds.
Closed compounds had a complex impact on the employment
of Africans in the labour process and a number of points
can be made. Closed compounds were, in part, a response
to a growing concern over the inefficiency of labour.
'Raw' Africans, unaccustomed to mine work, had to be driven
by overseers in the open mine. But underground, super-
vision was more difficult and mine managers resorted to
piece-wages to increase output. The move from time-wages
to piece-wages required greater endurance and skill from
African miners. In this connection, compound coercion
contributed to regular employment or regular re-employment
which provided a pool of labourers who knew mine work.
Moreover, not only was supervision difficult underground,
but discipline also posed a problem for mine management.
White contractors, who organised excavation and extraction
underground, were assaulted by labourers resisting super-
vision and greater output demands. In this respect, closed
compounds acted to contain violence in the work-place. And
finally, the establishment of closed compounds had a
depressive effect on wages. Unskilled wages were reduced as
bargaining was restricted and consumption collectively
organised by the mine owners.
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The introduction of closed compounds also had important
effects on the rest of the mine work force. In the 1880s
and 1890s this remainder made up between 10 and 20 per cent
of all workers. They were European and Coloured workers,
largely employed as overseers and artisans. In the period
of open compounds their employment was dependent on a con-
stant supply of African labourers. But with African mine
labourers incarcerated in closed compounds, this dependence
ended. Although the compound system meant the employment
of less overseers, it provided regular employment. And
regular earnings were the key differential separating the
privileged workman from the mass of unskilled manual
workers. This differential was further reinforced by the
exclusion of European and Coloured mine workers from
closed compounds. In turn, exclusion made non-African
workers more dependent on management for class alliances,
social position and notions of respectability.
Underground mining led to the introduction of skilled
underground miners with previous experience in coal,
ironstone or metalliferous mining. In this process the
balance of numbers within the non-African working class
shifted in favour of these new miners, while unskilled
open-mine overseers found themselves at the cutting edge
of redundancies. Nonetheless, the position of non-Africans
as a privileged stratum in the work force was entrenched
and they colluded with management in the subordination of
African labour. In effect, closed compounds sealed a
rigid division of labour between unskilled African workers
and non-African operatives, artisans, miners and supervisors,
a racial division of labour which was supported, in 1885,.
by the introduction of South Africa's first legal indus- ;
trial colour bar.11
This essay will deal with three themes in relation to
closed compounds. First, it will examine the way in which
closed compounds were modelled on convict stations. Then
it will analyse Kimberley compounds as a model for labour
control where Africans still retained independent access
to the land. And finally, it will expose the mine owners'
myth of Kimberley compounds as a model of social welfare.
CONVICT LABOUR
Convict labour was preferred to free labour in unskilled
occupations in the mining industry. The De Beers DMC,
which in 1885 was the first company to employ convicts on
a regular basis, pronounced that convicts were 'superior
to free labour in quantity, quality and reliability1.12
De Beers derived three essential advantages from convict
labour. Firstly, the length of time convicts stayed as
workers increased their productivity. 'It is by far the
best native labour we have1, reported Gardner Williams,
General Manager of De Beers DMC, 'owing to the fact that
the convicts are obliged to remain for a considerable
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length of time, while the free natives work only about
two months at a time'.13 Secondly, whereas free
labourers worked only as hard as they had to, the whiplash
of the convict guards coerced more output per unit from
convict workers. This was the crux of the advantage that
De Beers drew from labour 'so completely under its own
control'.11* And thirdly, it was able to prevent theft far
more rigorously with convict than with free workers. So
advantageous was the employment of convict labour that
De Beers DMC increased the number employed from 220 to 809
between 1885 and 1894 and continued to employ convicts
until 1932.15
Moreover, convicts were less expensive to maintain and
discipline than free labour. In 1885 Charles Rudd, a
director of De Beers DMC, announced that •convict labour
was not very much cheaper than free labour',*6. having
recently built a convict station and taken over 200 convicts
'completely off the hands of the government1.17 In 1887
convicts at £58 a year per man, including guards, food
and clothing were a little cheaper than free labour at £65
a year. In 1889 convicts cost De Beers £52 a year per man
and free labour a little more; in 1891 convicts cost
£54 10/- a year per man and free labour £46 16/-; and in
1894 the cost of convicts was reduced to £39 10/-, which
equalled the cost of free labour.18 The decline in wages
of free labour from a high of over 30/- a week to 12/- a
week in 1894 was a direct consequence of amalgamation,
compounds and the use of convict labour as a constant
reserve of workers. In fact, convict labour had the most
depressive effect on wages in 1890 when the number of
convicts employed was doubled to 700, which resulted in a
'large decrease in the number of free labourers1.19
Convicts were employed breaking up the blue (the
diamondiferous ground) on the De Beers DMC floors (where
the ground was laid out to weather after extraction- from
the mine) and at the sorting tables. They worked thirteen
hours in summer and nine and a half hours in winter, a
labour time which was two hours longer than the hard labour
regulations .of the Prison Department, but no longer than
the hours worked by free labour. They were controlled by
government-appointed, but company-paid Zulu guards,
initially one to every five convicts, a ratio which widened
to one to every ten convicts by 1891. However, discipline
was impossible to impose simply through physical force and
convicts were paid rewards of -/3 to -/10 per carat on
found diamonds. 'A convict who has been punished for a
misdemeanour•, wrote R.G. Scott, De Beers Convict
Superintendent, 'has it so completely in his power to
revenge himself on his employees either by sweeping the
diamonds from the sorting tables or burying them in the
soil with his heel from which he is now deterred by
thoughts of his own interest1.20 Nonetheless, parliamentary
compaints began to be made when it appeared that convicts
left their terms of labour with more money than free
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labourers. In 18 92, the 1886 percentage rates were
reduced to four and a half per cent per carat or a
maximum of £15 per term of service.2^
De Beers DMC began its negotiations with the Cape
government for convict labour in October 1884. They asked
for 300 convicts for floor work with an option for as many
more for underground work once De Beers mine was one holding
The company built a convict station out of sun-dried bricks.
The state provided the labour, while De Beers provided the
material at a cost of £5,200. From January 1886 the
company was given a government contract for the free
service of 300 convicts in exchange for company maintenance
and discipline of the convicts in the station. In 1888 the
government re-negotiatied the contract and charged the
company -/3 per day per man, a sum De Beers was glad to pay.
It should be noted that the Bultfontein Mining Company
(owned by Ochs Brothers, renowned London diamond broker)
was the only other company to hire, but not accommodate,
convicts.2 2
The quality of clothing, food and accommodation in the
De Beers Convict Station was superior to the same provided
in the Kimberley and Beaconsfield gaols. Convicts were
issued thick jumpers, moleskin trousers, felt hats, boots
'when necessary1, three blankets in winter and two in
summer and two sacks sewn together which formed a pillow
and pallaise to sleep on. As to diet, meat was the crucial
indicator of strength as hard labour could not be performed
on a mielie meal diet. At the convict station the regula-
tion diet included 1 lb of meat per man per day. In
addition convicts were entitled to a daily ration of one •
and a half pounds of bread, eight ounces of meal, one :
pound of vegetables, one ounce of salt and one quart of
soup. In the Kimberley gaol convicts sentenced to over
three months hard labour were on a less beneficial meal
diet, while under that term they were confined to mielie
meal diet. In 1884 rations were reduced and 350 long
sentence convicts went on strike. As a consequence
rations were reduced below subsistence and this in turn
led to an outbreak of scurvy. In fact, rations, in the
Kimberley and Beaconsfield gaols were so poor that bad
health kept a quarter of hard labour convicts on the sick
list.' For De Beers DMC it was more economical to feed
its convicts adequately. Similarly with accommodation,
although more attention was devoted to searching facili-
ties than to convict comfort. Convicts were searched on
entry to and exit from the station. They stripped in the
search houses adjoining the station and went naked to
their cells where they assumed their blankets.2 3
De Beers DMC had initially asked for 300 long-service
convicts, which meant prisoners sentenced to over three
months hard labour. However, as the Public Works
Department had a first option on convict labour, the
De Beers Convict Station seldom accommodated its full
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quota before 1888. In June 1887 the company was forced
to take convicts sentenced to less than two months. When
the convict contract was renegotiated in 1888 a long-service
prisoner was re-defined as a convict sentenced to two months
hard labour and over. Through this re-definition the state
shuffled off into private hands the costs of catering for
prisoners in over-crowded prisons, the Kimberley gaol holding
820 inmates when it had been 'designed' for 400 men and
women.2 V
The enormous number of pass convictions kept the De Beers
Convict Station well supplied with labourers. For many 'raw1
Africans their introduction to the diamond city was a transit
through the Kimberley gaol to the De Beers Convict Station.
There their cheap coerced labour went to swell the growing
dividends paid to De Beers DMC shareholders. Between July
1884 and June 1887 an annual average of 6,702 Africans were
arrested and 3,096 convicted for pass offences. In the same
period an annual average of 8,708 persons were convicted and
sent to the Kimberley gaol,25 However, pass offenders did
not become the trained workmen that the company required.
By the 1890s De Beers no longer drew its convict labour from
Kimberley. Other stations sent their long-term prisoners
to Kimberley and the majority came from the Transkei, while
others came from Dordrecht and Middelburg.26.
The tight discipline and systematic searching that was
possible with convict labour on the floors provided a
model for free labour employed both on the floors and under-
ground. fIn these convict barracks, or branch gaol', wrote
the Mine Inspector,
the perfection of the compound system may be said ;
to have been reached. The only important difference •
being that between compulsory and voluntary service.26
Initially the difference between compulsory and voluntary
labour was an important difference, but the primary function
of the closed compound system was to obliterate that
distinction.
CLOSED COMPOUNDS
The mine owners derived great economic advantages from
the closed compound system.and presented compounds as the
product of their paternalism and concern for the welfare of
their workers. Thus, on the one side of the compound coin
was the great economic benefit to mine owners of total con-
trol over African labourers, while on the obverse side lay
the great social benefit of protection from the various
forms of vice that pervaded the mining townships of
Kimberley. Whenever opponents of the compound system laid
the charge of slavery, the mine owners pointed to the moral
and material degradation of Africans prior to, and the
improvement in their well-being after the institution of
closed compounds. To ascertain whether this coin has not
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been debased through overuse, both sides need to be
re-examined.
The primary advantage of compounds to the mine owners lay
in the constant supply of mine labourers it provided. Here
re-contracting was the key'to the growth of a pool of
experienced mine labourers. Contracts commonly ran for two
months in De Beers and Bultfontein mines while they lasted
for three months in Kimberley. In all the mines Africans
re-contracted for additional time, while in the latter mine
'the majority re-engage for further periods up to nine months,
in some cases remaining for eighteen months'. 8 This was
the best evidence, argued mineowners, that Africans appre-
ciated the compound philanthropy of their masters.
Re-contracting was most often not the choice of African
labourers, but the product of compound coercion. The intro-
duction of compounds, without Parliamentary sanction,
abolished what vestige of protection the Masters and
Servants Acts gave to Africans. Breaking a contract on the
part of a servant had always been a criminal offence and
Africans had always weighed the pros and cons of entering
such a dangerous bond. But the one advantage registration
of a contract did hold was that legally contracts came to
an end, at which point servants could withdraw their labour
from one employer to offer it to another or some could leave
for home. Incarceration in a closed compound blurred this
choice and by 1890 had obliterated the distinction between
free and unfree labour.
Between 1885 and 1891 no compounded African was freely
contracted. The Registrar received a list of names from
compound managers; he wrote out contracts and then
re-delivered them to the compounds.29 In 18 91 the Registrar
went into the compounds to contract workers. Nonetheless, •
numerous Africans remained uncontracted. In the largest
compounds, the De Beers West End compound, a compound which
grew from a complement of 400 in 1886 to 2,300 in 1888 to
2,900 in 1895 (half the mine work force), at least one-third
to a half of the labourers were continually uncontracted.30
There were a number of reasons for this. Companies
regulated the number of labourers they allowed to leave the
compounds. when there were others to take their place all
was well. But when competition from the Gold Fields became
too strong or seasonal fluctuations too sharp, Africans were
coerced into remaining and there was little the Registrar or
the Protector of Natives could do about it. Secondly, not all
compounded Africans were in full employment. For example, when
the Bultfontein Mining Company stopped washing 120 of 500
compounded Africans became unemployed and continued to live
on their savings. In 1888 the unemployed proportion in the
Kimberley Central compounds was generally 200 out of 1,200
Africans. At the same time Africans in the De Beers compound
only worked a four-day week. Thus, not only did compounds
give mineowners a constant supply of labour, but they also
retained a reserve pool of labour to fall back on in time of
strikes or disasters.31
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The first compounds to be closed accommodated recruited
labourers. The Kimbcrley Central DMC had been recruiting
labour since 1881 through Natal from Inhambane under the
organisation of Reuben Benningfield, a director.32 When it
compounded its underground workers in April 1885, they were
all recruited, the extra costs being recovered through
abnormally long one-year contracts. Before De Beers DMC
closed its free compound, 'arrangements1 were made with chiefs
in Basutoland, Bechuanaland and the Transvaal 'for a
continuous supply of labourers1.33 in October 1885 the
Bultfontein Mining Company compounded its Zulu sorters, who
were contracted for six months. They were not paid weekly
like other labourers, but at the end of the contract.31*
Recruitment and delayed payment were part of the repressive
methods mine managers used to spin out the length of a
compound contract.
The most abrasive aspect of compound coercion was the
assumption by compound management of the judicial functions
of punishment reserved to the state in the Masters and
Servants Acts. This reservation, which had been a partial
safeguard against employer maltreatment, became an
undisguised blessing in comparison to the private power
wielded over Africans in closed compounds. No state
regulations circumscribed the conduct of compound managers.
They had their 'own way ,of treating natives* and adopted
their own 'method of maintaining order1.3S Almost all
compounds practised a system of fines. Fines were inflicted
to protect companies 'against the natural impulse of human
nature, white and black, to do as little work as possible
and to get drunk whenever occasion offers'.36 Fines were
combined with solitary confinement and authorised and
unauthorised floggings.
The De Beers mine compounds had 'a bad name amongst the
natives' because of maltreatment and assaults.37 Seymour
Dallas, dismissed Superintendent of the-De Beers Convict
Station, but later re-employed as the Manager of the West End
Compound, gave workers a choice of detention or a flogging
by himself.38 Moreover, compound guards, European or Zulu,
compensated for African assaults on contractors underground
by assaults in the compounds.39 However, guard assaults were
more often the result of African refusal to work in dangerous
parts of underground workings. Although workers could remain
unemployed and unpaid under a labour contract, the refusal
to work when commanded was a criminal offence, which guards
dealt with rather than the Resident Magistrate. In one case,
Charles Riordan, Head Guard of the West End compound, flogged
a team of twenty-two Africans for refusing to work, confined
them in a detention cell for five days and then dismissed them.
The Protector of Natives examined the evidence of the thrash-
ing a week afterwards and found that 'the scars or wounds
were still raw and about four inches in length'.1*1 He pointed
out that 'this indignity was perpetrated on men between the
ages of 40 and 50 years, Colonial Kaffirs and of the most
civilized1 bearing. In the view of the Protector lasting
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scars were a bitter humuliation for Colonial Africans, but
not for 'Inhambanes or Shangaans1 who 'take these things as
a matter of course'.'11
The Kimberley Central DMC closed its compounds to force
inexperienced African labourers into underground works.
Africans struck, but once William Mcllardy the General
Manager had dismissed the strike leaders he was able to
coerce his workers into the mine. Without the convict
reserve which gave De Beers a solid position in the labour
market, the Kimberley Central was unable to introduce the
compounds refinements, such as detention cells and wire
mesh, aimed purely at the prevention of theft- Instead
i.t indueed Africans into the compound through the provision
of liquor and the promise of a free Sunday each week to
go on the town. The Bultfontein Mining Company followed the
same policy, which though it had no underground works, was
initially necessary when Africans still had the option of
an open or closed compound.42
By 1888 all African workers were compounded. But com-
pounds were not completely functionally integrated into
the organisation of the labour process. The Kimberley
Central, for example, had not separated its surface from
its mine labourers, while its tram drivers (largely 'Cape
boys1) remained at liberty. The De Beers DMC was more
efficient in its labour-management, concentrating the
greatest number of workers, introducing detention cells
in 1886 and segregating surface and mine labourers. 'Cape
boys' resisted compounds and mine work as they objected
to being 'treated in the same manner,as ordinary raw
Kaffirs'.1*3 However, in the 1890s a stable compound was
set up for 240 workers who were 'mostly Cape Boys and
Colonial Kaffirs. ' At the same time the monopoly company had
two mine compounds {for over 4,000 Africans) and one floor
compound (for about 1,000 Af ricans) . ** "*
Once all the companies had closed their compounds, and
even more so when the monopoly had been established (1889),
resident African miners spent the greater part of their,
lives in compounds. The monopoly company continued to .
recruit 'raw' Africans and to have a migrant turnover in
its compounds, but part of the work force was made up of
African miners, who devoted their lives to mine work. In
1888 Arthur Davis, Manager of the Bultfontein Mining Company
said he had African workers in his company who had been with
him for seven or eight years. In 1902 Gardner Williams
wrote that some Africans had remained in his compounds
continuously for ten years. However, the established
pattern of life for the resident miner was an alternation
between mine labour and location 'resting'. In 1894
location landlords lived well off miners who rented rooms
to recuperate for two to six weeks before returning to the
compounds. **5
Thus the one side of the compound coin remains unsullied:
they were a great advantage to the mine owners in reducing
wages, the elimination of drunkeness, greater labour
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productivity, the prevention of theft and in easincj the
passage to a controlled proletarian work force. But where
did the advantages for labourers lie? Gardner Williams,
General Manager of De Beers Consolidated, spoke for De Beers1
workers in an address to shareholders:
Our natives are better housed and better fed than
uncompounded natives and are better paid than the
miners in any of the European countries. Those
unfit for work, either through sickness or on account
of injuries received in the mine are taken free of
cost in the Company's hospital which adjoins the
compound. There are fewer accidents under the
present system than there were in the open workings.
A very large majority of the accidents in the mine
is due either to the carelessness or the stupidity
of the natives themselves. A large percentage of
the deaths in the compound had been caused by
receiving natives who come in companies from
countries north of the Transvaal, many of whom are
so starved and emaciated as to be beyond help.1*6
The complacency of these statements is remarkable, coming
from a man who had dictatorial control over. African workers1
lives, which were lost through a death rate unequalled in
Southern Africa and a mine safety record unequalled in the
whole of Africa, then or since.
The number of deaths from accidents had reached critical
porportions before the development of underground mining,
but the latter made a miner's work even more dangerous.
'Anything over 3 persons killed per thousand1 wrote A.E.
Sawyer, a Mining Inspector from Staffordshire, 'is now a
days considered bad1.1*7 In England and Wales, between
1884 and 1891 the death rate was under two per thousand.t(8
On the Witwatersrand the death rate averaged a little over
four per thousand between 1896 and 1905. **5 in Southern
Rhodesia the mine death rate never went over five per
thousand between 1907 and 1933 and for the latter half of
this period averaged around two and a half deaths per
thousar.-.50 Worst of all, the Kimberley death rate was
nine and a half per thousand between 1881 and 1889, with
De Beers mine as the most dangerous with a rate of 18.3
per thousand.51
In £art this high death rate was the product of the novel
and treacherous nature of underground mining in diamondiferous
ground. Vast caverns were excavated in the blue, transfor-
ming the Kimberley and De Beers mines into gigantic honey-
combs . The blue left as pillars was inherently unsafe, as
it disintegrates on exposure to the atmosphere and to water.
There were also greasy slides between large blocks of blue,
which slipped without warning. Consequently the roofs or
underground workings were constant sources of danger.
Furthermore, fire-damp was a threat while candles were the
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major means of underground lighting. And finallv, mud
rushes became the most feared underground hazard, bursting
into tunnels and filling them up with terrifying speed.52
However, despite these manifest dangers to life, the Mining
Inspector concluded that 'the majority of employers of
labour in these mines look upon regulations for safety as
mere harrassing restrictions1.53
The novel nature of mining and the treacherous qualities
of the blue were exacerbated by competition to increase
production. The De Beers DMC pushed its workers to the
limit to catch up with the greater production capacity of
the Kimberley Central DMC so as to improve their stake in
the amalgamation struggle. In doing so the De Beers
management flouted safety regulations with catastrophic
results.5t* In July 1898 a fire broke out underground and
out of a work force of sixty-seven Europeans and 625
Africans, twenty-four Europeans and 178 Africans perished.
The Commission that investigated the disaster found that
there were no fire extinguishers in the mine, that there
was a lack of adequate ladderways and that as the shaft
that was supposed to be the escape shaft had been closed
at the time of the accident, the management should have
discontinued mining. Those who survived were rescued through
opening up a tunnel into the open mine. Although Gardner
Williams received absolution from the Chairman of the De
Beers Consolidated Mines a-t its first AGM, he was implicitly
held culpable by the Commission of Enquiry. However, it was
Captain Hambly, as.the government appointee responsible for
mine safety, who was pilloried for this mine disaster.
Stow, a Life Governor of De Beers Consolidated, (which
absorbed the De Beers DMC) re~ferrre~H to the Commission report
as an 'unqualified indictment against the old company and
its Managers1.5S
Accidents accounted, however, for only a proportion of
the high mortality rate on the Diamond Fields: disease
took the lion's share of lives. Perhaps the contribution
of compounds to mortality can best be exposed through a
general comparison with the Kimberley gaols, the companion
institution for the 'benefit' of Africans. For as the
Rev. James Poote remarked, in one of the few public
disclaimers made by an African against the advantages of
closed compounds, there were two gaols at Bultfontein and
one of them was the Bultfontein Mining Company's compound.56
As the prisons functioned as pauper hospitals, a
comparison with compound deaths reveals little: prisoners
and patients were shuffled between the two institutions.
A comparison between open and closed compounds is difficult
as large open compounds were in their hey-day during the
depression and the small-pox epidemic (1882-1885). Both
exacerbated mortality and its true extent was successfully
concealed by the mine owners.57 However, the Kimberley
death rate in 1888 with a decreasing population and closed
compounds was far worse than the death rate in 1878 with an
increasing population and open compounds. These two years
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Diering, a major liquor wholesaler, protested bitterly
that the depression had reduced the liquor trade by 70 per
cent and that deaths were caused by inadequate accommodation
provided by companies. 'The farmers make better provision
for their cattle1, he said, 'than the companies for their
natives'.65 And once closed compounds had been established
Dr. Watkins, in an authoritative analysis of the increase
in the number of deaths in the late 1880s, concluded that
the 'increase was general to the whole population and far
greater in proportion in the case of children, (showing)
that it was due to causes wholly apart from the drink
question.'66
Overcrowding and insufficient protection from the cold
were worse in the closed compounds of the late 1880s than
in the superceded open compounds. Both open and closed
compounds were, however, improvements on the Kimberley and
Beaconsfield gaols. There appalling conditons and over-
crowding remained unchanged from 1874 to 1882 to 1887, the
three times they came under investigation.67 Less than
4 00 cubic feet per man/woman in a sleeping compartment was
decidedly injurious to health. In 1880 there was 164 cubic
feet per man in the European cells of the Kimberley gaol,
while in African cells the overcrowding was worse. fl In
1887 in one part of the Kimberley gaol known as Coleman's
compound there was fifty-one cubic feet per man, while the
women's yard and the Beaconsfield prison were worse.
'Prisoners have not had sufficient room to lie down',
reported the 1887 Commission, 'without lying on one
another ... ',69 Moreover, overcrowding, which was largely
the product of pass arrests, was exacerbated by the fact
that 'the prisons are asylums for lunatics, hospitals for
prisoners and chronic sick paupers and refugees for the
destitute whose presence in the gaol ... greatly interferes
with discipline1.70 As if this was not enough, the Kimberley
gaol was located on a site of 'old cess pools' and whenever
it rained the cells were swamped.
In the face of these manifest disadvantages, in terms
of shelter Africans were better off in open and closed
compounds. However, all the evidence points to severe
overcrowding of most open compounds, although the epidemic
of small-pox exacerbated the effects of this.71 in late
1883 Doyle found that sickness was four times as bad
amongst compound dwellers as amongst night soil collectors.
He also found that compounds were more congested than the
space requirement per man of 350 cubic feet, with ample
ventilation.72. But clearly some compounds provided better
shelter than others. In 1886 Doyle found that the death
rate of fifteen in a thousand in Kimberley compounds was
acceptable, but the De Boers DMC and Victoria DMC had a
death rate which was 'excessive', while the convict station
came out with the best sanitation and shelter.73 In 1891
space per man in the sleeping quarters of the monopoly
company's compounds was less then the desired 300 cubic
feet.7'1
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Closed compounds grew rapidly in size in the late 1880s
and with the development of systematic shift work, their
capacity was doubled. In addition, the wide open space in
the centre of the rectangular compounds (De Beers West End
compound covered five acres) disguised the overcrowding in
the sleeping compartments. But the most damning evidence
against improved material conditions in closed compounds was
provided by the 1888 De Beers fire disaster. 'We are told
that the natives for the night shift1, reported the Commis-
sion of Enquiry.
were in the habit of going down into the mine .
early in the afternoon because it was warmer
there than in their compound, and that they would
be about the mine smoking or sleeping, but always
with lighted candles near them.75
This lack of warmth was a structural feature of De Beers
mine compounds. Africans slept on the ground in blankets
in quarters without doors and with an open space around the
top of the walls. While this aided ventilation during
summer and during the day it did not exclude the intense
cold at night and during the winter. Although De Beers was
proud of providing 'free1 wood and water, the quantity of
heating and water facilities were inadequate. Moreover,
the Protector questioned whether 'in the face of the great
amount of profits made out of these natives that they receive
anything for nothing.'76 In fact, wood and water were inclu-
ded in the costs of compound maintenance and recovered through
the 'percentage placed on the goods' bought in the compound
stores.77 '.
The greatest iniquity propagated by Gardner Williams
in his Itemisation of compound benefits to Africans was the
assertion that medical care was provided 'free of cost'.
Throughout the whole of the 1380s and 1890s Africans provided
the largest subsidy to the Kimberley Hospital through the
hospital tax they paid on registration of a labour contract.
When employment declined sharply during the depression the
hospital went into the red and had a choice of either to raise
a loan or the hospital tax. The Hospital Board decided to
do the former.78 On the provision of free medical care, the
Protector put the view of the African worker:
As to medical comforts and food supplied free,
this may be correct from the company^ point of
view, but certainly not from the natives for
each native in the compounds pays 12/- a year
hospital tax and having done this is entitled to
medical attention. It matters not how this
money, which reaches a very large sum is
appropriated, it is paid by the natives so it
cannot be said that they get it free.79
The rudimentary health care in the prison hospital was a
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better service than that provided by companies in their
closed compounds. In fact the quality ojj the gao.l hospital
and the Kimberley Hospital was depreciated by companies sen J 1~
ding Africans to hospital 'merely to d i e 1 . 8 0 The Kimberley
Hospital 'threatened proceedings against compounds managers 1,
said Dr. J.R. Mackenzie.
if they continued to send men to the hospital
quite moribund; and did so, the companies sent
them in so that they remained in hospital a .few
weeks or a month with fever, and then recovered,
while before they were only there a few days and
died. 8 1.
Indeed, the Kimberley Hospital improved its service in the
late 1880s, doubling the number of its African admissions
between 1885 and 1888, while proportionately its death rate
declined. 8 2
This was a savage indictment of the sort of health care
Africans could expect in compound hospitals. Clearly
different compounds varied in the standard of medical care
on offer to Africans. The Kimberley Central made no 'special
provision1 for sick Africans as the compound manager believed
they were better cared for by their 'brothers1 in their
quarters. 8 3 De Beers West End Compound provided a better
service with a visiting doctor, dispensary and five or six
nurses. 8 4 Nonetheless, Africans were not paid while they were
ill and compound managers ignored the Employers' Liability
Act, which had been rushed through Parliament in 1886 by
the commercial Parliamentary representatives of Kimberley.
The consequence of this ignorance was a 'plethora of lame
Kaffirs', who if they were not given light work in the •
compounds, were 'thrown out into the streets without a
crutch ... in a most disgraceful fashion and allowed to
starve'.8 5
The quality of African diet was generally dependent on food
prices and the state of the mine economy. During the depres-
sion prison rations were cut and an outbreak of scurvy was
the consequence. Combined with overcrowding the appearance
of this malady was not surprising. The next major outbreak
of scurvy took place in the closed compounds of De Beers
during tl^ e siege of Kimberley (1899) and was similarly the
produc't of a cut in rations and overcrowding exacerbated by
a war regime. 8 6
Nonetheless, when crisis conditions did not prevail,
Africans who chose to feed themselves were better of f in open
then in closed compounds. In the same way as 'board wages'
were an improvement on an all-inclusive wage, eating
houses and higher wages in open compounds provided a better
standard of living as compared to bulk bought meat and meal
and lower wages in closed compounds. Moreover, not only lower
wages but loss work. 'You could never ration them', said F.R.
Thompson, De Beers DMC compound manager,
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because we work 900 men in 2 shifts .. to work
900 men we want 1,400 or.1,500 men for natives
won't stand the whole week with the white miner.
They work for four days, and then we have to have
a batch of men to go on, so that it would be
impossible to ration them. If you were to ration
the natives you would either find them all sick, or
not wanting to work, because they would get their
food all the same , whereas now they say we must
work to get food.87
African consumption was socialized through the operation of
food-clubs composed of from three to four men. They bought
their provisions from compound stores, whose managers became
bankers, as they put it. The food clubs gave their wages
to the store managers who operated a credit system with
steady workers.
Mine managers argued that closed compounds enabled
African workers to save more. Estimates varied from twenty-
five to forty per cent more than before, estimates based on
European conceptions of Africans as spendthrifts. Only 'raw1
Africans, novices in the consumption of liquor, were
excluded from this generalisation. James Clifford the
Kimberley Central compound manager estimated that the average
saving after six months service was £14 10/-. Thus compounds
taught Africans the virtues of the Protestant work ethic and
thrift. But what managers did not include in this wonderful
benefit to Africans was that they took twice as long to earn
this amount in closed compounds as they had under the open
regime.8 8
Gaols had only two advantages over closed compounds.
Firstly, Africans did not have to work as hard in prisons as
in compounds. Furthermore, prison stretches were regarded
as occupational misfortunes and convicts were at least fed.
Secondly, Africans in gaol did not have to suffer the
privation of five days in detention cells before they were
released. 'To obviate the smuggling of diamonds by time-
expired natives', wrote F.R. Thompson.
I introduced what was known as the solitary cell
system. The cells are buildings with concrete
floors and walls and lighted by electricity. The
natives about to be discharged were first made to
undress and then bathed. They then received
blankets and large leather gloves were locked on
their hands. In these cells the natives were
detained with suitable precautions for five days.89
This was a serious hardship for, even though they were fed
in detention 'free of cost' as the parsimonious Williams
was wont to point out, they were not paid wages.90 In 1903
De Beers wanted to increase the period of detention to
seven days, but the Registrar warned against it as he feared
there would be a riot. l
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Closed compounds in the late 1880s and 1890s provided
Africans with the bare necessities of life. What improve-
ments companies made were more for surveillance purposes
rather than for worker comfort, with the possible exception
of the swimming pool in the West End compound. The use of
electric light was turned first on the compound and only
after the fire disaster used to illuminate the underground
works. Nonetheless, compounds were worth substantial sums
of money., ranging from £2,000 to £5,000. This was, however,
little indication of the quality of amenities. Even the
Kimberley gaol, floating on cess pits, would have fetched
£6,000 in 1887 for use as a compound. Compounds were
essentially corrugated iron enclosures designed to keep
workers secluded rather than content. African miners were
seldom asked to describe the quality of their lives for their
rulers in commissions or newspapers, but the odd occasion
when an African was given a voice the experience of compound
coercion left a simple preference for the freedom of the
towns. And why? 'Because life is more pleasant'.93
In conclusion, the assumptions made by historians that
standards of accommodation and amenities improved with the
introduction of closed compounds is an acceptance of manage-
ment's view of itw own benevolence. Van Onselen has called
this the 'board-and-lodging myth'91* and in -Kimberley, as in
Southern Rhodesia, it was used to rationalize coercion and
reductions in wages. Kimberley's compounds differed from
its imitators on the Rand and in Southern Rhodesia in being
closed, whereas they in various degrees were not. But the
greater compound self-sufficiency that this entailed did not
lead to a higher standard of material life for Kimberley
workers. Kimberley's compounds surpassed those mine
compounds further to the north in encouraging a death rate
of enormous proportions. And that crime has been hidden
for far too long under the greater weight of capitalists'
claims to their diamond property.
**********************
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